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Abstract
In 1932 Dewey and Tufts issued an extensively revised edition of their famous
Ethics of 1908. Both versions are now available as public domain resources on the
Internet, and teachers are likely to assign the second edition, since it reflects the
authors’ mature views. However, at least as regards Dewey’s treatment of virtue, I
argue that the earlier version is pedagogically superior to the later one. I contend
that the revised treatment of virtue is in fact less true to the book’s celebrated genetic
approach, and that the first edition also makes better use of the cultural resources
that Dewey could reasonably assume were at the disposal of his public.

John Dewey’s Ethics, which he co-authored with James Hayden Tufts, is now
available as an online text in the public domain. Indeed, unrestricted access copies
are obtainable on the Internet for both editions of the Ethics: the first edition of
1908 and the much revised second edition of 1932. This should be welcome news
for teachers, because the book represents a cornucopian instructional resource.
The Ethics constitutes an ambitious and comprehensive work that is organized into
three distinct parts, which respectively treat the historical and cultural background
of Western mores, the main currents of Western moral theory, and the ethical
aspects of several modern social problems. Given the text’s wide sweep, readings
could be assigned from it that would complement nearly any course in which moral
philosophy predominately figures.
The second edition was issued approximately twenty-four years after the first,
and was so extensively revised that Dewey and Tufts begin the preface to the later
edition by admitting their doubt as to whether it might not have been better to call
it an entirely new book. The basic layout and approach of the original were retained,
but apparently about two-thirds of the text was completely rewritten. In their preface
to The Later Works edition (Vol. 7: 1932) of the revised Ethics, Abraham Edel and
Elizabeth Flower point to several significant changes that Dewey introduced to
the section on moral theory, a section for which he served as the sole author in
both editions. The modifications are important enough to merit thinking of the
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1932 version as representing Dewey’s mature views on the subject. Nevertheless,
I will argue that—at least as concerns the unit on virtue—teachers should assign
the original edition instead of the revised one because the former is pedagogically
superior to the latter.
In what follows, I contend that the revised treatment of virtue is in fact less true
to the book’s celebrated genetic approach (and hence less effective pedagogically),
even though Dewey continued to embrace that approach. Furthermore, I argue
that the first edition makes better use of the cultural resources that Dewey could
reasonably assume were at the disposal of his public than does the second.

The Genetic Approach
In their preface to the first edition, Dewey and Tufts emphasize the book’s genetic
approach to its subject matter, to which they credit three distinct advantages. In
the first place, they claim that through learning about the mores of bygone eras
students instinctively compare them to their own moral beliefs, and so gain a
keener awareness of the latter. Secondly, the study of the human past provides
a carefully documented record of how people have actually behaved under the
influence of different customs and beliefs, and so furnishes a body of reliable data
for moral theory. Lastly, by tracing the origins and careers of various ethical ideas,
the concepts in question are presented in simpler and more intuitive forms than if
they were simply introduced in their fully developed versions. The most important
reason for the authors’ adoption of the historical approach would appear to be
pedagogical, and they specifically cite their own “classroom experience” as evidence
for the effectiveness of the method. That pedagogy was a foremost consideration for
Dewey and Tufts was only natural, since they were explicitly proposing the Ethics
as a textbook. The preface includes specific suggestions to instructors confronting
time limitations as to which chapters could be most easily elided from lesson plans.
The layout of the text was consistent with the authors’ commitment to the
genetic treatment of their topic. Part I, which was wholly written by Tufts, comprises
an historical survey of the major cultural eras of Western civilization, namely, the
Greek, Roman, Hebrew, medieval, and modern. Part II presents a synopsis and
analysis of Western ethics, followed by a sampling of practical moral problems
in modern society in Part III, to which both authors contributed chapters. The
various parts were carefully integrated, so that, for example, Dewey’s treatment of
moral philosophy in Part II makes continual reference to the historical contexts
in which the various moral philosophies arose, contexts explored in Part I. As
Edel and Flower note, this integration was one of the book’s major selling points
in 1908, and was one of the reasons that it attracted twenty reviewers at the time.1
Dewey’s original discussion of virtue fits well into the book’s overall design.
The virtues receive their own chapter, with sections analyzing each of the four cardinal virtues in turn: temperance, courage, justice, and wisdom. Dewey explicitly
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anchors his presentation in Western culture by making etymological references and
relating the four cardinal virtues to Greek, Roman, and Christian traditions. Thus,
the student who has even a superficial acquaintance with Plato, Aristotle, Cicero,
or Aquinas will readily find some familiar points of reference in the presentation.
In the revised edition, the discussion of the cardinal virtues is considerably
compressed, rendering the analysis much denser and consequently harder to follow. Virtue no longer receives its own chapter, but is instead treated in a section
at the tail end of a chapter entitled “Approbation, the Standard and Virtue.” Gone
are the section headings for the individual cardinal virtues, as well as most of the
discussion which situated them in the Western heritage. Indeed, only a passing
allusion is made to the cardinal virtues. The new analysis insists upon the futility
of cataloging the virtues, due to the fact that customs and objects of interest are
continually changing in post-traditional societies, and differ from era to era and
from culture to culture. In fact, Dewey argues that the virtues can only be defined
in terms of their qualities as interests, and he proceeds to focus almost exclusively
upon these qualities, which makes his analysis quite formal and abstract. The reader
is provided with little in the way of Aristotelian-style concrete examples of virtue
and vice, in which the former constitutes a golden mean between the excesses and
deficiencies of the latter. In addition to abandoning any attempt to list the virtues,
Dewey insists upon their natural interpenetration in moral character, and on the
fact that they cannot be adequately considered in isolation from one another.
Neither the emphasis upon virtues as qualities of interest nor the doctrine of
their interpenetration were new to the later edition. Dewey had made essentially the
same points in 1908, but nevertheless had still provided his public with the time-honored framework of the cardinal virtues. As we have seen, in the revised presentation
of virtue there is much less that would be easily recognizable to the average student.
It’s arguably an odd strategy in a work intended as a textbook for a broad public. His
revised treatment of virtue portrays the subject matter as being so free flowing and
interconnected that the general reader interested in the virtues could easily feel himor herself to be beholding the nighttime sky from some planet in a distant galaxy,
a skyscape in which all the familiar points of orientation—the moon, the pole star,
the visible planets, the Milky Way, the constellations—are missing.
Dewey’s revised presentation of virtue is actually quite reminiscent of his
treatment of religious faith, in that the topic of interest to the general reader is
so altered under his optic as to become nearly unrecognizable. His major treatise on religion was A Common Faith, in which he propounds a naturalized and
humanistic transformation of the various historical religions, arguing that a religious dimension of experience can exist divorced from any and all beliefs in the
supernatural. Because the supernatural claims of the various religions are at best
highly speculative, and at worst patently contradicted by modern science, Dewey
promotes a profound theological reform. But, of course, many believers would no
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longer recognize their own faith after such a reform, or perhaps see any point to
it. For the religiously devout, genuine faith inherently involves belief in the divine,
in an eternal realm and eternal beings that are distinct from the physical universe.
Is not Dewey’s continued use of words such as “faith” and “religious” within the
framework of his atheistic naturalism idiosyncratic and needlessly confusing?
The Deweyan reply, of course, is that the deluge of new knowledge and theories which has resulted from the application of scientific methods of inquiry has
rendered many inherited beliefs and ways of thinking obsolete, or at least in need
of serious revision. Indeed, the intellectual reconstruction of traditional ideas and
values in the light of improved scientific understandings is one of the chief tasks
that he sees for contemporary philosophy. On this score, he is undoubtedly correct in a general sense, but his conservative critics have long charged that in some
instances the mission of philosophical reconstruction is little more than intellectually dolled-up progressive political ideology. The mistake of many conservatives
has been to almost wholly reduce Dewey’s thought to an underlying social and
political agenda, and to thereby overlook his considerable contributions to every
major branch of philosophy.
Nevertheless, the conservative complaint that the call for intellectual and cultural reconstruction is somewhat insidious, because it so easily lends itself to being
abused, is not wholly without merit. Perhaps Dewey’s Hegelian heritage predisposed
him in some instances to find dialectical Aufhebung (synthesis or sublation) where
others would more realistically see jagged historical ruptures, discontinuities, and
dead ends. History, after all, is replete with the tragic, in the form of catastrophic but
meaningless acts of nature; the frequent frustration of human hopes and desires;
and irreparable, bitter loss, the latter of which extends from the mortality of the
individual to the death of entire cultures and ways of life. The question of religious
belief, at least as concerns the world’s major forms of organized faith, would appear
to admit of little middle ground. For most religionists, the existence of the divine
is not simply a possibility, but a strong likelihood, whose significance for human
affairs cannot be easily overestimated. In light of the scientific and historical evidence, naturalism arguably provides the best-warranted theoretical perspective on
the universe, but for most religionists its adoption would mean the death of their
faith. The traditional believer is confronted by a tragic choice that pits intellectual
scrupulousness against the fulfillment of deep-seated needs for security and reassurance. Atheist or true believer, no one can have it all, and one is reminded of the
fact that many a former addict occasionally mourns the loss of his or her substance
of choice, as one would a departed lover.
By stretching the lexical meaning of some key terms to the point of warping
them, Dewey would appear to give us religion without the divine. By the end of
his discussion of virtue, one is left wondering whether he would also give us moral
character without the virtues.
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Moral education is not politically neutral. Dewey’s contention that a fixed
canon of the virtues along ancient lines would not be well-suited to the multi-cultural, rapidly innovating societies of the present is undoubtedly correct. Even if
this point be granted, however, the question still remains as to how to best manage
the challenges created by highly fluid social conditions. Dewey’s progressivism is
perhaps most evident at this juncture, because he more or less opts to embrace the
dissolution of the ancient traditions and canons; nevertheless, a more conservative
response is also conceivable. One could recognize the inevitability of change in the
long run, but try to slow it down in order to mitigate the shock of the new in the
short term. The American sociologist Charles Horton Cooley, whose works were
repeatedly cited by Dewey and Tufts in the Ethics, put this issue this way: “whether
even an inadequate type of culture is not better than no type at all.”2 From a conservative standpoint, Dewey could be reproached for having overestimated the
intellectual and emotional capacity of the masses to successfully integrate new
ideas and adapt to novel social circumstances.

Moral Evolution
Edel and Flower argue that one of the major theoretical changes in the revised edition was Dewey’s rejection of the first edition’s unilineal theory of moral evolution.
According to the unilineal conception, moral evolution involved a transition from
customary morality, which was informed by a collectivist mentality, to reflective
morality, which could only arise in the conscience of a critically minded individual.
On this view, moral evolution tracked closely with the growth of individualism
as displayed in the temporal trajectory of Western civilization, hitherto the most
advanced stage of political and economic liberalism. Per the unilineal model, insofar
as non-Western societies are able to advance socially, they will do so along the path
blazed by Occidental ones.
By 1932 Dewey had come to see the unilineal model as being untenable. His
acquaintance with the work of anthropologist Franz Boas, a colleague at Columbia, was a decisive factor in his change of mind. Boas is perhaps best known for
his criticism of unilineal theories of social evolution and his development of an
alternative to them. He was able to persuasively argue that the claims of the unilineal theorists were largely speculative by demonstrating in a number of cases
that the ethnographic data was inconsistent with the unilineal model. His general
approach was to show that the same data could be more consistently interpreted
by assuming that each culture was primarily the product of its unique setting and
history. Skeptical of sweeping theories of social evolution, Boas insisted upon the
need for cultural anthropology to establish a sound scientific foundation through
painstaking fieldwork and meticulous description of specific cultures. Like the historian studying a past occurrence, who assumes that no two historical events are
identical, it was incumbent upon the anthropologist to recognize the uniqueness
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of each culture. Just as the historian must be ever wary of anachronistic bias, so
must the anthropologist be perpetually on guard against ethnocentric chauvinism. In order to counter ethnocentric bias, Boas propounded cultural relativism
as a methodological principle, arguing that the anthropologist should seek as far
as possible to identify any culturally acquired beliefs, values, attitudes, or habits
which might skew his or her perception or understanding of the target culture, and
suspend them, at least for the purposes of anthropological study.
Dewey’s mature view of Western individualism is consistent with Boas’
anthropological theories. In addition to the influence exerted by the latter’s arguments, both China and Japan provided Dewey with examples of societies which
were clearly advanced, but nevertheless noticeably more communalist in their basic
cultural orientation than their Occidental counterparts. Dewey lectured in Japan
in 1919, and travelled from there to China, where he subsequently stayed for two
years. By the time of the rewriting of the Ethics, he no longer treated individualism
as a higher stage in a universal pattern of societal evolution, but rather emphasized
the need to understand it as a distinctive development within Western culture,
involving specific historical circumstances and causes.
The revised version of virtue is also clearly in line with Boas’ cultural relativism. Indeed, Dewey’s standpoint in the passages in question is virtually that of
a cultural anthropologist. His analysis assumes that as a rule virtue and vice represent those aspects of character which are commonly perceived to be helpful or
harmful to others. However, because such perceptions vary from culture to culture, the specific contents of the virtues as well as the definite forms that they take
are culturally relative. Hence, his analysis focuses on their most generic features,
which would be those most likely to be cross-cultural. He asserts that although
the customs which constitute the subject matter of the virtues are transient, their
characteristic qualities as social interests are more enduring.
While cultural relativism arguably proved to be an important heuristic for
ethnologists, its use by Dewey is problematic, since it indirectly suggests a basic
equality of all cultures—past and present, primitive and advanced—for the purposes
of his study. Indeed, he argues that no community could survive without attitudes
of approval or disapproval regarding certain aspects of communal living, such as
respect for human life, fairness, and so on. Even in the absence of formal law, such
shared attitudes serve to support and enforce the basic rules without which even
the most rudimentary forms of social organization would scarcely be possible. All
forms of action which are truly social, and not just instances of two or more individuals operating in close proximity to each other, involve cooperation; and cooperation is a rule-governed form of behavior. In order for two people to effectively
combine their forces and coordinate their conduct, each partner must adopt the
intended end of the activity as his or her own. Even if only for the satisfaction of
some momentary need, the individual must intentionally shape his or her behavior
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to conform to the aim in question. In a well-functioning partnership, interaction
appears almost choreographed, since each action on the part of the one calls forth
a relevant response and invitation on the part of the other. In other words, in cooperative behavior the individual submits him- or herself to a joint end, essentially
rendering it as his or her rule of action.
Dewey is probably correct that all cultures employ group approbation and
disapprobation in order to achieve a minimum of social order and harmony, and
so have their respective catalogs of virtues and vices. Nevertheless, his revised
treatment of virtue tends to undermine his overall genetic approach to moral theory, because his survey is primarily concerned with cultures in which morality is
not predominately customary, but reflective in nature. Although he cautions that
in practice neither type exists in a completely pure form, he clearly believes that
mores in primitive societies are mainly of the customary variety, whereas reflective
morality is realized to its fullest extent in advanced civilizations.
Mores are not the only component of culture which typically differs in simple
versus complex societies. In their earliest forms, many of the core components of
culture, such as language and religious beliefs, undoubtedly arose in a more or less
spontaneous and unplanned manner. In simple societies tradition represents the
single greatest source of moral authority, though of course the customary way of
doing things is never completely impermeable to change, accidental or otherwise.
For instance, cultural diffusion has sometimes resulted in considerable alterations
to time-honored modes of thinking and acting in even the most insular communities. On the whole, however, few social agencies exist to challenge the legitimacy
of custom in primitive cultures. In societies with an advanced division of labor, on
the other hand, the development of specialized knowledge and technology tends to
generate new social roles which fall outside the general cultural pattern. Once distinct social action systems have emerged, the basis is laid for conflict between the
ways of the elders and those of the specialists. The former is bent on transmitting
the cultural heritage, and the latter strives to achieve certain, narrowly delimited
ends through instrumental reasoning. On the one side, the stability of the tried
and the true beckons, whereas on the other, the promise of discovery, innovation,
and progress calls.
People can, of course, adopt customs and respect traditions and nevertheless possess little genuine historical consciousness, and indeed this is true for most
members of primitive societies. While such cultures evidently have some degree of
collective memory that is preserved in oral traditions, it generally does not rise above
the level of anecdote, legend, and myth. Full-fledged historical awareness involves
a chronological ordering and evidence-based interpretation of events which aims
to descry their causes and significance. In his Philosophy of History, Hegel argued
that historical consciousness was originally ushered into being in states with edicts
and laws, since in order to achieve its long-term plans the political class required
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actors capable of understanding the purpose of prior legislation, which always
implied a well-defined before and after. Hence, whereas stateless societies had little
historical awareness, advanced ones could not function without it. Within the new
perspective, society could itself be taken as an object of thought and its institutions
and practices recognized as human creations susceptible of being redesigned, at
least to some limited extent.
The idea of purposefully reorganizing society was probably originally suggested by the appearance of the sole agency up to the task, namely, the state (i.e.,
any centralized form of government with a monopoly on the legitimate use of
force). As Hegel argues, law was probably the earliest and most important tool at
the disposition of the first social engineers. Furthermore, whereas culture in simple
societies is almost entirely the result of spontaneous and uncoordinated contributions from the entire community, in complex ones the cultural heritage has been
supplemented by the efforts of specialists, such as scholars and artists. Indeed, the
continuous development of the cultural heritage in advanced societies is so rich
and elaborate that it cannot be adequately conveyed to the rising generations in
a casual and desultory manner, after the fashion of simple societies, but requires
formal schooling for its transmission (a point that Dewey insists upon in the first
chapter of Democracy and Education [see Section 3: The Place of Formal Education]).
The difference between historically aware cultures versus those which lack
historical consciousness extends to the conception of virtue. Although many simple
societies have their particular lists of virtues and vices, in the West and in China the
conception of virtue underwent considerable expansion by philosophers. Dewey’s
assumption that virtue and vice tend to be almost wholly identified with specific
customs and actions among primitive peoples is confirmed by a wealth of ethnological observations.3 The very interests that he identifies as the most enduring aspects
of virtue—namely, wholeheartedness, persistence, and impartiality—themselves
presuppose a cultural innovation in which a fundamental distinction was drawn
between the mere appearance of virtue and the real McCoy. The new emphasis
on the psychological dimension of virtue is only natural in more complex social
environments, wherein the ongoing division of labor has resulted in novel forms of
behavior and social roles that spring the confines of custom. Because the individual
has increased opportunities for choosing between different courses of action, his or
her decisions and motivations take on greater significance. The notion of virtue is
gradually detached from specific actions and social roles, and it comes to be seen
as a more generic underlying aptitude and propensity of the unique individual that
largely determines the interpersonal qualities of his or her conduct. In short, moral
character proper is born, and with it, personality and conscience.
As regards Western culture, Plato’s depiction of the life and times of Socrates
constitutes the iconic exploration of the gap between the demands of conscience
and the enticements of worldly success. Many of Socrates’ interlocutors struggle
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to some extent with the temptations of power, prestige, or wealth, and Plato offers
a dramatic yet often humorous parade of Athenian notables through his pages,
including politicians, playwrights, and priests. The enduring value of the dialogues
has probably had less to do with Plato’s specific vision of the good life than it has
with his unforgettable portrayal of what it means to seriously undertake the quest
to live in accordance with virtue. As pursued by Socrates and his students, self-examination and philosophical reflection are shown to be indispensable elements of
the good life. The cultural transmission of Plato, say, in an introductory philosophy
course, contributes to a community of inquirers whose very existence represents
a living tradition of reflective morality, a tradition that has to be actively taught if
it is to perdure.
At least in principle, Dewey agreed with this view, as is clearly evinced by his
commitment to the genetic method for the purposes of both analysis and instruction
in the Ethics. In the chapter on the didactic significance of geography and history
in Democracy and Education, he observes that the genetic method was perhaps the
chief scientific achievement of the latter half of the nineteenth century. Its principle
is that the way to get insight into any complex product is to trace the process of its
making,—to follow it through the successive stages of its growth.4
The learning of history, he argues, better equips the student to “make human
connections” in a manner which deepens his or her understanding of contemporary
institutions and practices. The historical approach adopted in the Ethics is perfectly
consistent with this view, and in his introduction to the section on moral theory,
Dewey explains that the aim is not to provide the student with “commandments”
or a “catechism,” but rather to enrich his or her understanding of the issues so as
to make the student’s personal decisions better informed. Yet the second edition’s
abridged version of virtue fails to elucidate the presence and nature of the living
past-in-the-present nearly as effectively as did the original.
Dewey’s correspondence with Tufts regarding the revision of the Ethics shows
that perhaps he himself was aware of this shortcoming. In a letter that Dewey probably wrote to his co-author in 1930, dated August 9, he included an outline of Part
II, according to which an entire chapter was to be dedicated to virtue, and was to
be structured as follows:
Ch Two VIRTUE AND VICE
Sec one Virtue as Goodness of Character. That is, approved habits constitue
virtues. Contraxst again of custom and reflection. ||
Sec Two. Intellectual Virues—Concerned with formation of intentions
forseesight fo consequences. Platonic theory of wisdom. Nature of thoughtfulness, etc.
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Section three Executive Virtues, Seeing things, including judgments,
through Force, ”courage” etc
Section Four Esthetic Virtues—or excellence of immediate disposition,
feelings etc. Importance of order, proportion, grace etc Temperance.
Section Four Virtue as completeness, integrity, Ju[s]tice, Righteousness
etc relations of justice and charity, kinds of justice etc. (about eight thousand words)5

In the revised version that ultimately went to press, the chapter in question was
reduced to a mere section, and the discussion of virtue was correspondingly compressed. Consequently, none of the distinct treatments of the intellectual, executive,
and esthetic virtues that had originally been planned remained. In a subsequent
letter to Tufts, dated October 23, 1931, Dewey makes the following remark concerning his ongoing revision of Part II:
Dear Tufts ,
You must be wondering what Im doing with the Ethics. Before I went to
Austria last August I got five chapters of Part Two rewritten. I re-wrote
what I rewrote several years ago, shortening it still further, and I hope improving it, tho perhaps I am cutting out almost too much of the historical
theoretical parts.6

While this comment does not precisely identify the passages on virtue as among
those about which Dewey is worried that he has excised too much historical material, they would certainly constitute likely candidates!
As to Dewey’s specific rationale for opting for the pedagogically weaker presentation of virtue, we can, of course, only speculate. However, given that Boas’ cultural
relativism played a key role in his decision to reject the unilineal model of moral evolution that was implicit in the first edition, it seems probable that he believed the revised
treatment of virtue to be more consistent with the relativist perspective. The revision
proved to be problematic, however, since even the revised version of the Ethics presupposes a form of moral evolution, albeit no longer a unilineal one. Despite the new
recognition of the historical particularity of Western individualism, both Dewey and
Tufts remain committed to the distinction between customary and reflective morality,
and to the thesis that the former is characteristic of simple societies, whereas the latter
is promoted by the social conditions associated with the appearance of civilization
proper. In other words, although the revised version of the Ethics rejects a unilineal
model of moral evolution, it still presupposes the existence of moral development,
albeit in a multi-lineal form. By “moral development” the authors do not, of course,
mean that people have become more virtuous, but rather that there has been a growth
of moral understanding and moral imagination that has generally accompanied the
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development of more complex forms of social organization and interaction. In fact,
their perspective seems to anticipate the views of some twentieth-century neo-evolutionist anthropologists and sociologists, such as Elman Service and Talcott Parsons.
In 1931, just one year prior to the issuing of the revised edition of Ethics, Dewey published a collection of essays under the title Philosophy and Civilization that included a
treatise entitled “Interpretation of the Savage Mind,” the thesis of which he described
as a contribution to “genetic psychology.” Dewey’s neo-evolutionism is even more
apparent in his treatment of the “savage mind” than it is in Ethics.
Strictly speaking, Boas’ cultural relativism only rejected the claims of the
unilineal school of social evolution, and did not discard the idea of social evolution per se. Nevertheless, Dewey’s neo-evolutionism goes a step further than Boas’
cultural relativism, since the very enterprise of moral theory presupposes the existence and legitimacy of reflective morality. The entire Ethics is in fact an exercise in
reflective morality, and so inherently privileges the reflective over the customary
moral standpoint. Indeed, Dewey and Tufts’ stated intention is to make reflective
morality even more reflective. While the advanced nations of the Occident were
not the only societies to achieve thoughtful moral self-awareness, such self-consciousness was, by the authors’ own admission, infrequent at best in primitive cultures. Hence, Dewey’s revised treatment of virtue is somewhat confusing, because
it fails to make explicit the fact that the contemporary Occidental notion of virtue
incorporates meanings which reflect the historic contributions of virtue theorists.
Dewey’s standpoint in the second edition would appear to be that of a citizen of
the world who is elaborating a meta-ethics, rather than that of a Western moral
philosopher who is writing to a predominately Western public. Yet he continued
to tout the genetic method of instruction as a way of shedding light on cultural
meanings, and thereby helping the student to access a rich heritage. Because his
original treatment of virtue was much truer to the genetic approach, it constitutes
the superior version, at least for instructional purposes.
Lest my thesis be too broadly construed, I should hasten to add that I am
by no means claiming that the 1908 edition of the Ethics is superior overall to the
1932 revision; indeed, I tend to believe the contrary, since I think that most of the
changes introduced by Dewey and Tufts were warranted. My contention concerns
only the section on virtue. Happily, given that both editions are now available with
unrestricted access on the Internet, teachers can easily assign selections from both.

Notes
1. John Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Vol. 7: 1932 (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985) viii.
2. Charles Horton Cooley, Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1909), 388.
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3. See, for instance, C. R. Hallpike, The Evolution of Moral Understanding
(London: Prometheus Research Group, 2004), especially pages 175–77.
4. John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Education (New York: The Free Press, 1944), 214.
5. The Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871–2007 (I-IV). Electronic Edition.
Volume 2: 1919–1939. 1930.08.09? (07199): John Dewey to James H. Tufts. Misspellings retained from original.
6. Correspondence of John Dewey, 1931.10.23 (07214): John Dewey to
James H. Tufts.
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